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Executive Summary
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA), with the goal of reforming the United States health care system and providing
insurance for millions of uninsured citizens and residents. One component of the legislation was
the expansion of Medicaid eligibility, which would extend to include all individuals “under age
65 whose family income is at or below 138 percent of the federal poverty guidelines ($14,484 for
an individual and $29,726 for a family of four in 2011)” (NCSL, 2015). This provision was
challenged in the United States Supreme Court, which ruled that mandatory expansion was
unconstitutional and held that Medicaid expansion must be implemented at the discretion of
individual states. To date, 32 states, including Washington, D.C., have implemented Medicaid
expansion; the majority of expansions became effective January 1, 2014.
One predicted effect of Medicaid expansion was an increase in hospital revenues, due to an
increase in insured individuals, a likely increase in the number of individuals seeking care, and a
decrease in uncompensated care. The intent of this research is to determine whether this effect
has occurred, specifically in academic medical centers and teaching hospitals. There has yet to be
substantial research on this topic; however, several factors are presented in the literature that bear
on the effect of Medicaid expansion on hospital financial measures. First, the occurrence of a
crowd out effect is likely as eligibility is expanded. Some individuals already insured through a
private insurer have become eligible for Medicaid, and may change their coverage. Thus, the
makeup of new Medicaid enrollees is unlikely to be solely the previously uninsured, which
would limit the expansion’s effect on hospital financial measures. Second, Medicaid programs
often reimburse care providers at lower rates than do private insurers or Medicare. Depending on
the size of the crowd out effect, revenues may be affected by these lower reimbursement rates.
To conduct this analysis, I collected utilization and financial data from 31 academic medical
centers and teaching hospitals in 20 states. Sixteen hospitals are located in states that expanded
Medicaid, while the remaining 15 hospitals are located in non-expansion states. I chose a fixed
effects model, to control for time-invariant differences between the hospitals. I estimated four
regressions, using different financial measures as dependent variables in each model: total
revenue, total income, operating margin, and net patient revenue. I controlled for variables that
could influence the aforementioned financial measures, including number of discharges, case
mix index, and payer type.
The analysis found that Medicaid expansion was significantly associated with increases in total
hospital revenue and net patient revenue, and with a decrease in operating margin. These results
were robust to several checks. This analysis is important to gain a comprehensive understanding
of the effects of the Medicaid expansion. Furthermore, Medicaid expansion is a highly dynamic
issue. Expansion is actively under discussion in several states, while at least one state is
considering reforming the expansion already in effect. Political changes at the federal level may
also lead to changes in health care legislation. Thus, it is evident that further study is critical to
understanding the short- and long-term effects of Medicaid expansion in the United States.
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Introduction and Background Information
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is one of the most significant
policies to be implemented in recent years. The legislation, signed into effect on March 23, 2010,
represents a drastic change to the American health care system in an attempt to provide insurance
coverage for the majority of the 42 million uninsured U.S. citizens and residents (Smith &
Medalia, 2014). The primary mechanisms by which to increase coverage are the individual
mandate, employer requirements, expansion of public programs, and subsidies. The individual
mandate is the requirement that all U.S. citizens and legal residents have qualifying health
insurance. Those who fail to acquire coverage must pay a penalty, which amounts to the greater
of 2.5 percent of taxable income or a flat fee per family member, up to a maximum of $2,085 per
year (U.S. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2016). The employer requirements
mandate that employers with at least 50 full-time employees provide employer-sponsored health
insurance; if designated employers fail to do so, they also face a penalty (Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2013). The public program expansion refers to a significant expansion of Medicaid,
discussed in greater detail below, as well as the requirement that the Children’s Health Insurance
Program (CHIP) remains operational at its current levels for several years (Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2013). Finally, subsidies to be used for the purchase of health insurance were made
available to U.S. citizens and legal immigrants whose incomes are at or below specified income
limits, as well as to qualifying small employers for their employees’ coverage (Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2013). These four components collectively attempt to ensure health insurance
coverage for the majority of uninsured citizens and residents.
The Medicaid expansion is a significant, and contentious, component of the ACA.
Provisions in the original act required expansion of Medicaid in all states to individuals “under
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age 65 whose family income is at or below 138 percent of the federal poverty guidelines
($14,484 for an individual and $29,726 for a family of four in 2011)” (NCSL, 2015). However,
this provision was challenged in the United States Supreme Court, which ruled that Congress
may not withhold state Medicaid funding on the basis of failure to comply with the Medicaid
expansion; this effectively made the expansion voluntary for states. For states that elected to
expand Medicaid, the federal government will pay 100 percent of the cost of newly eligible
enrollees through the end of the 2016 calendar year; federal funding will then gradually decrease
to 90 percent by 2020, and remain at that level thereafter (Dorn et al, 2013). This is in contrast to
the federal medical assistance percentage of 57 percent paid for other, previously enrolled
Medicaid beneficiaries (Dorn et al, 2013). Currently, there are 19 states in which Medicaid has
not been expanded, and 32 states (including Washington, D.C.) in which Medicaid was expanded
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016). The majority of expansions became effective on January 1,
2014.
The expansion of Medicaid, in conjunction with the individual mandate and other
mechanisms to encourage widespread health insurance coverage, was hypothesized to have
several effects. One such effect was an increase in hospital revenues as the combined result of an
increase in insured individuals, a likely increase in the volume of individuals seeking care, and a
decrease in uncompensated care. This analysis seeks to understand the effect of Medicaid
expansion on hospital revenue, income, and operating margin, by comparing financial measures
of academic medical centers and teaching hospitals in states that did and states that did not
expand Medicaid.
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Literature Review
Predicted Effects on Hospital Revenues
Much of the literature studying the effects of the Medicaid expansion is focused on
reductions in the number of uninsured individuals and improved health outcomes. Furthermore,
because the Medicaid expansion has been operational for just over two years in most expansion
states, there is a paucity of post-expansion data to be analyzed. However, the existing literature
that makes reference to the financial implications of the Medicaid expansion for hospitals
describes an anticipated immediate increase in revenues for hospitals.
The Medicaid expansion is not the only component of the ACA to have an impact on
hospital revenues. The ACA will also decrease funding for “hospitals that serve a large number
of Medicaid and low-income uninsured patients,” called disproportionate share hospitals, by $56
billion between 2013 and 20221 (Rudowitz, 2013; Dorn et al, 2013). Additionally, the ACA
reduces Medicare fee-for-service payments by $260 billion (Dorn et al, 2013). An intentional
secondary effect of the Medicaid expansion, and other aspects of the ACA, was the expected
increase in hospital revenues to counteract these payment reductions; a predicted increase of
$294 billion in hospital revenues between 2013 and 2022 would help to offset the
aforementioned revenue losses (Dorn et al, 2013).
The increase of $294 billion is not a net estimate. The expansion of Medicaid was also
anticipated to have a crowd out effect; as Medicaid eligibility grew to incorporate millions of
new individuals, some would already be insured through private coverage. Because Medicaid

The disproportionate share hospital (DSH) classification is determined by a ratio that sums “the percentage
of Medicare inpatient days attributable to patients eligible for both Medicare Part A and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), and the percentage of total inpatient days attributable to patients eligible for Medicaid
[but] not Medicare Part A” (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2015). All hospitals in this study are
classified as DSH with the exception of the hospital in Maryland; all hospitals in Maryland are excluded from
DSH payments.
1
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would provide a new, lower-cost option for insurance, some individuals would likely shift their
coverage from private to public providers by enrolling in Medicaid. Crowd out and its effects
will be discussed in greater detail below, but generally speaking, it is possible that hospitals
could lose over $100 billion in private payments from individuals who switched from private
insurance to Medicaid coverage (Dorn et al, 2013). In spite of losses due to crowd out, however,
hospitals were still likely to generate a net increase in revenues from Medicaid; an analysis from
the Urban Institute predicted that the net increase in total U.S. hospital revenues due to the
Medicaid expansion would be over $180 billion (Dorn et al, 2013).
Another significant anticipated effect of the Medicaid expansion was a decrease in
uncompensated care. The vast majority of uncompensated care is provided to full-year uninsured
individuals; those lacking any insurance account for approximately 85 percent of all
uncompensated care, whereas part-year uninsured individuals comprise the remaining 15 percent
(Hadley et al, 2008). Uncompensated care contributes to bad debt for hospitals, resulting in
lower net income. Therefore, a significant increase in the number of individuals with insurance,
due to the Medicaid expansion and other aspects of the ACA, should result in lower costs related
to uncompensated care, and thus higher net income for hospitals.
Factors Specific to Medicaid Programs
There are factors inherent to Medicaid that must be considered as context for this
analysis. First, though Medicaid is a federal program, it is administered by states. Thus, there is
heterogeneity between state programs “in terms of enrollment procedures, demographics of the
target population, and state politics” (Sommers & Epstein, 2010). Therefore, Medicaid will look
different in each state that adopts the expansion, and estimates of its impact are, by necessity,
generalizations of a great diversity of circumstances and effects.
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Additionally, expansion of eligibility does not invariably lead to full enrollment. Lack of
take-up of public programs such as Medicaid is not a new phenomenon. For example, in 1997,
only 51 percent of nonelderly adults eligible for Medicaid were enrolled (Davidoff et al, 2001).
Furthermore, a study following the 1994-1996 Medicaid expansion that aimed to provide
coverage to uninsured children found that 47 percent of Medicaid-eligible children were
unenrolled (22 percent were uninsured, while an additional 25 percent were covered under
private insurance) (Selden et al, 1998). It is likely that take-up will be higher under the ACA than
under previous expansions, due to the individual mandate, the employer requirements, and the
penalties associated with noncompliance; however, less than complete take-up may result in
smaller revenue increases than were originally estimated.
Finally, Medicaid reimbursement rates are substantially lower than those of Medicare and
private insurers in most states (Decker, 2007; Gruber & Simon, 2008). Because Medicaid is a
state-run program, states have significant discretion in setting their reimbursement rates, leading
to great variation between states. In spite of this, reimbursement at a lower rate still provides
more income to hospitals than does uncompensated care. Yet not all new Medicaid enrollees
were previously uninsured. The next section discusses the effect of crowd out, which will be a
key factor in determining the extent to which hospital revenues are affected as a result of
Medicaid expansion.
Crowd Out
As described above, crowd out is likely to occur when the expansion of Medicaid causes
more people to be eligible for coverage, some of whom were previously covered under private
insurance. Because Medicaid is a lower-cost option for coverage, some people will shift their
coverage to Medicaid, decreasing private insurance enrollment. Crowd out is more likely to
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occur in higher-income populations (i.e. those above the federal poverty level), because higherincome individuals are more likely to already have private insurance coverage (Gruber & Simon,
2008). Studies of previous insurance expansions have had mixed findings regarding the
prevalence of crowd out. Gruber and Simon (2008) find that, in recent public insurance
expansions, “the number of privately insured falls by about 60 percent as much as the number of
publicly insured rises.” However, they acknowledge the propensity of similar estimates to vary
significantly, as they are sensitive to methodology, type of data, and how crowd out and overlap
are defined (Gruber & Simon, 2008).
The ACA increased the eligibility of Medicaid to those with incomes at or below 138
percent of the federal poverty level. Gruber and Simon (2008) find that "the rise in Medicaid
coverage is largest for the group between 100 and 200 percent of poverty... [and] this is also the
group that sees the largest decline in private coverage." This is relevant to the current analysis
because, the greater the impact of crowd out, the less likely hospital revenues are to increase by a
substantial margin. As discussed previously, health care covered by Medicaid is often
reimbursed at a lower rate than care covered by Medicare or private insurance. The more
individuals who trade their private coverage for Medicaid, the more losses in revenues are likely
to be incurred by hospitals. This analysis will not attempt to calculate the effect of crowd out in
the case of the ACA's Medicaid expansion; however, it is an important factor to consider when
interpreting the results.
Results from Early Expansions
Five states—California, Connecticut, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Washington—and
Washington, D.C. implemented limited Medicaid expansions between passage of the ACA and
the widespread expansion date of January 2014. Their results are instructive, considering that
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longitudinal data from the majority of Medicaid expansion states will not be available for several
years. Key findings are discussed below.
Connecticut implemented a limited Medicaid expansion in April 2010. Prior to passage
of the ACA, "parents and caretakers with incomes up to 185 percent of the federal poverty level
were eligible for Medicaid in Connecticut" (Nikpay et al, 2015). However, adults without
children were only eligible for a state-based medical assistance program with limited benefits;
further, these adults had to have incomes below 56 percent of the federal poverty level, and hold
less than $1,000 in assets (Nikpay et al, 2015). Upon passage of the ACA, Connecticut expanded
full Medicaid coverage to adults without children, and removed the contingency based upon
assets (the income requirement remained the same) (Nikpay et al, 2015).
Nikpay, Buchmueller, and Levy (2015) conducted a study to ascertain the effect of this
expansion on Medicaid volume and uncompensated care in Connecticut. The results of their
study find that, post-expansion, Medicaid discharges increased significantly when compared to
the rate of change in other states (Nikpay et al, 2015). Additionally, "Medicaid revenues more
than doubled: a relative increase of $148.5 million compared with a pre-expansion baseline of
$135.8 million" (Nikpay et al, 2015). However, the increase does not represent a net gain for
hospitals; approximately 56 percent of new Medicaid enrollees transferred from a different state
health coverage program (Sommers et al, 2013). Therefore, as opposed to increasing total patient
volume, the effect of the Medicaid expansion was mainly to change the hospital payer mix
(Nikpay et al, 2015). Finally, uncompensated care in Connecticut neither increased nor decreased
after the Medicaid expansion, whereas it increased significantly in other states (Nikpay et al,
2015). Thus, these results indicate that hospitals cannot definitively expect a net increase in
revenues as a result of Medicaid expansion. The effect on revenues will depend in large part on
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the extent of crowd out and, in particular, the number of newly insured individuals compared to
previously insured individuals who shift their coverage to Medicaid.
Other findings from states that implemented early Medicaid expansions vary. California's
expansion was notable in that its number of new enrollees was vastly higher than enrollees who
transferred from existing state or local health coverage programs; 88 percent of enrollees were
new, compared to 12 percent who transferred from other programs (Sommers et al, 2013).
Although California expanded eligibility to incomes of up to 200 percent of the federal poverty
level in some counties, Washington, D.C. did the same and had only 23 percent of total
expansion enrollment comprised of new enrollees (Sommers et al, 2013).
Thus, it is challenging to find conclusive takeaways from early state adoptions of
Medicaid expansion. In general, however, we may make two assumptions based on the literature.
First, it is evident that Medicaid expansion is unlikely to have a homogenous effect in all
expansion states. Second, the Medicaid expansion's effect on hospital revenues is inexorably tied
to other factors, such as crowd out, the effect on uncompensated care, and state program
differences, and is thus difficult to predict in a generalizable way.
Research Design
In this study, I investigate the question: To what extent has the Medicaid expansion
affected hospital financial measures? The units of analysis are hospitals; more specifically, only
not-for-profit academic medical centers and teaching hospitals are included in the analysis.
Academic medical centers and teaching hospitals make up a critical component of the United
States health care system. They “provide more than 40 percent of charity care, and account for
20 percent of all hospital admissions, surgical operations, and outpatient visits” (Health Research
Institute, 2012). They also tend to care for more high-acuity patients and patients with more
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complex medical issues than do other hospitals (Association of American Medical Colleges,
2014). Thus, these hospitals are integral in providing high-level care, particularly to populations
with fewer resources, and therefore are likely to be affected by the expansion of Medicaid.
Data Collection
I collected existing longitudinal (panel) data related to hospital utilization and financial
measures for 31 hospitals in 20 states for the fiscal years 2011 through 2015. Nine of the states in
the analysis have expanded Medicaid, while the remaining 11 have not (as of April 2016). This
corresponds to 16 of the hospitals in the analysis being located in expansion states, and the
remaining 15 hospitals being located in non-expansion states.
I acquired data from two databases. All utilization data (i.e. number of discharges per
year, average case mix index, etc.) were retrieved from Vizient, an alliance of nonprofit
academic medical centers and teaching hospitals in the United States. I gathered corresponding
financial data from Modern Healthcare’s Healthcare Systems Financial Database, which collects
quarterly and annual audited financial data for over 400 hospitals in the United States. Of the 128
hospitals with utilization data available in the Vizient database, only 40 hospitals also had
financial data in the Modern Healthcare database. There is no relationship between the two
databases. Thus, hospitals that appear in both databases do so by chance and are not related in
any way.
I eliminated nine of the 40 hospitals because they are located in states that implemented
limited early expansion of Medicaid (California, New Jersey, and Minnesota). This leaves 31
hospitals in the analysis. Due to Vizient’s public disclosure guidelines, individual hospitals may
not be identified or identifiable in this analysis.
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Methodology
To conduct this study, I estimated four fixed effects regressions. Using a fixed effects
model allows me to hold constant, or “fix,” the average institutional effects of each hospital, an
important aspect considering the model includes 31 hospitals in 20 states, which implies variance
at the unit level.
In order to draw a causal inference, there is an identifying assumption that must be made
with the use of a fixed effects model: any unobservable factors that might affect both the
dependent and independent variables of the model are time-invariant. It is obvious that there are
differences between hospitals; however, I assume that these inherent differences, which might
include the political or economic climate of the hospital's state, do not change over time. Thus,
by controlling for said unobservable variations between hospitals, I can use the model to estimate
the change in the variables included in the model.
The basic equation for the fixed effects regression is as follows:

where

is the dependent variable, or one of several hospital financial measures (see Table 2),

with i representing entity and t representing time;
variable;
hospital; and

represents each independent variable;

is the coefficient for each independent
is the entity-specific intercept for each

is the error term. In this model, there are 11 independent variables. They are

described in further detail in Table 1 below. The key independent variable is Medicaid
expansion, which is a dummy variable that has a value of zero for hospitals in states that have
not expanded, or for years prior to expansion, and has a value of one for years during which
Medicaid expansion is effective. The remaining independent variables were selected based on
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their likelihood to affect hospital financial measures. Thus, by controlling for each independent
variable, I eliminate their ability to influence the estimate results.
Table 1: Independent Variables
Variable

Type of Variable

Measurement

Hypothesized
Relationship
Positive

Medicaid expansion

Dummy

Cases (discharges)
Mean length of stay
Percent of cases that go to
intensive care unit (ICU)
Mean ICU days
Cases with one or more
complications
Case mix index2

Continuous
Continuous
Continuous

0= no expansion/
pre-expansion;
1= post-expansion
Number of cases
Days
Percent of cases

Continuous
Continuous

Days
Number of cases

Positive
Positive

Continuous

Positive

Emergency admissions

Continuous

% private payer

Continuous

% Medicaid

Continuous

% Medicare

Continuous

Case mix index
metric
Number of
admissions
Percent of cases
with private payer
Percent of cases
with Medicaid as
payer
Percent of cases
with Medicare as
payer

Positive
Positive
Positive

Positive
Positive
Negative

Varies

It is difficult to assess the financial condition of hospitals with a single measure. Therefore, I
estimated four fixed effects regressions using different hospital financial measures as dependent
variables: total revenue, total income, operating margin, and net patient revenue. Each dependent
variable is described in Table 2 below. Total revenue represents all money that a hospital has
taken in over the course of the fiscal year; in other terms, total revenue is a measure of gross

Case mix index is a metric that describes average resource intensity of a patient’s condition, i.e. how
expensive it is to treat the patient. Patients are assigned to a diagnosis-related group (DRG) based upon their
diagnoses. DRGs are weighted according to resource intensity; the average DRG weight for a hospital is its
case mix index (CMI) (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, n.d.) CMIs generally range between
approximately 0.3 and 3.4, with higher numbers indicating greater average resource intensity.
2
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financial gain. The primary component of total revenue is revenue from patient care, but it may
include other sources of revenue such as research grants, investment or capital income, gift shop
sales, and/or donations or bequests. Income represents net financial gain, or a hospital’s surplus
after subtracting expenses from revenue. Operating margin is a measure of profitability, which is
calculated by dividing a hospital’s income by its total revenues. Net patient revenue measures
revenue derived solely from patient care. Estimating the effects of Medicaid expansion on
several financial indicators allows a more comprehensive understanding of the effect of
Medicaid expansion on hospital financial status.
Table 2: Dependent Variables
Variable

Type of Variable

Measurement

Total revenue
Total income
Operating margin
Net patient revenue

Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous

Millions of dollars
Millions of dollars
Percent
Millions of dollars

Summary Statistics
In order to provide context for the interpretation of the analysis results, Table 3 presents
summary statistics for the four dependent variables. Note that the figures are means for all
hospitals included in the study.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Dependent
Variable
Total revenue
Total income
Operating
margin
Net patient
revenue

FY2011
Mean
$1.58 billion
$105 million
3.16

FY2012
Mean
$1.68 billion
$114 million
3.73

FY2013
Mean
$1.78 billion
$117 million
2.88

FY2014
Mean
$1.94 billion
$158 million
3.63

FY2015
Mean
$1.95 billion
$216 million
5.45

$1.34 billion

$1.48 billion

$1.53 billion

$1.64 billion

$1.60 billion
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Validity
The measurement validity of this study is clear. The analysis examines financial trends,
which are shown directly through the variables discussed above. Additionally, the financial data
is audited, which further strengthens its validity. Because there is not a need for proxy variables,
or variables that are representative of other concepts, measurement validity exists inherently in
this model.
Causal Inference
In order to posit causal inference (in this case, that Medicaid expansion caused certain
changes in hospital financial measures), two assumptions must be made: that there are no
omitted variables, and that there is no reverse causality. Omitted variable bias occurs when a
variable that is correlated with both the dependent variable and one or more independent
variables is excluded from the model. There are myriad demographic, economic, and
environmental factors that may impact hospital financial measures. However, unobservable
variables that are time-invariant are controlled for through the fixed effects model. Additionally,
the factors that are directly observable within a hospital that are generally known to have an
effect on hospital financial performance, such as cases with complications, number of
discharges, and average length of stay, are included in the model. It is possible that there are
time-variant factors that occurred or changed over the course of time included in this study; this
is discussed further in the Limitations section, but does not pose a strong risk to the estimates
presented here.
Reverse causality describes an occurrence when the dependent variable determines the
independent variable; here it would mean that higher hospital revenues, income, or operating
margin caused implementation of the Medicaid expansion. Intuitively, this is unlikely. First, the
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decision to expand Medicaid is made at the state level, whereas the units of analysis in this
research design are individual hospitals. Levels of revenue or income for individual hospitals
would not determine the decision to expand or not expand Medicaid for an entire state. Second,
even if individual hospitals’ financial measures were indicative of average health care financial
indicators for an entire state, it is more likely that lower hospital revenues would determine
implementation of Medicaid expansion, due to its predicted effect of providing financial benefits
to hospitals.
Analysis
The analysis shows that Medicaid expansion is significantly associated with increases in
total revenue and net patient revenue, and with a decrease in operating margin. Table 4 presents
estimates for the four fixed effects regressions.
In the states included in this analysis, Medicaid expansion is associated with an average
increase in hospital revenues of approximately $237 million and an average increase in net
patient revenue of approximately $150 million, controlling for other factors. Medicaid expansion
is also associated with an average decrease in operating margin of -1.26 percentage points, all
else equal. All three estimates are statistically significant at the p < 0.1 level. There was not a
statistically significant effect of the Medicaid expansion on total income.
These results support the hypothesis that Medicaid expansion has a positive and
significant effect on hospital revenue. The decline in operating margin warrants further
commentary. As described previously, operating margin is a measure of profitability. Thus, these
results indicate that, on average, hospitals are experiencing increased revenue, but lower
profitability. This could be due to several factors. One is the increase in acuity of patients
seeking medical care, thus requiring greater resources for treatment. According to a recent study
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Table 4: Regression Statistics

Medicaid expansion
Discharges
Mean length of stay
% ICU cases
Mean ICU days
Cases with 1+ complications
Case mix index
Emergency admissions
% private payer
% Medicaid
% Medicare
Constant
Observations
Number of units
Rho
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Total revenue
237.0*
(125.9)
0.0234
(0.0181)
-54.94
(207.2)
-7.670
(8.214)
-2.037
(6.273)
0.350***
(0.126)
1,726**
(839.2)
-0.0463
(0.0308)
-48.07
(36.55)
-20.23
(26.14)
-76.09
(48.33)
3,201
(2,364)
124
31
0.917
0.396

Total income
71.01
(54.24)
0.0118
(0.00789)
2.020
(84.62)
-3.009
(4.231)
0.498
(2.650)
0.141**
(0.0621)
91.79
(396.5)
-0.0234
(0.0140)
-26.78
(18.01)
-13.20
(11.73)
-33.46
(21.49)
2,040*
(1,048)
124
31
0.825
0.228

Operating
margin
-1.260*
(0.640)
0.000114
(0.000120)
-1.270
(2.180)
-0.00887
(0.0459)
0.220**
(0.0971)
0.00236***
(0.000585)
-8.971
(6.199)
-6.59e-05
(0.000180)
0.383**
(0.186)
0.250**
(0.0936)
0.404**
(0.163)
-12.44
(9.028)
124
31
0.944
0.252

Net patient
revenue
150.1*
(78.32)
0.0144
(0.0110)
-166.2
(163.8)
-9.600*
(5.196)
1.874
(4.529)
0.259***
(0.0837)
1,408**
(592.8)
-0.0262
(0.0189)
-12.52
(20.93)
-0.679
(16.11)
-25.64
(27.75)
997.6
(1,522)
124
31
0.952
0.462

of policyholders conducted by the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, “people newly
insured under the Affordable Care Act were sicker, used more medical care and had higher
medical costs than those who already had coverage” (Pear, 2016). Another reason could be an
increased number of individuals covered by Medicaid seeking treatment. Because Medicaid
generally reimburses at rates lower than those of Medicare and private insurers, a shift in payer
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mix to a higher percentage of patients being covered under Medicaid would likely have a
negative effect on operating margin.
Robustness Checks
I took several measures to check the robustness of these results. I first corrected for issues
related to autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, and multicollinearity in the original models. By
eliminating an independent variable that was causing multicollinearity, and calculating robust
and clustered standard errors, I addressed these issues.
I also estimated several other regressions as further robustness checks. First, I estimated
similar regressions that used the percent change in the dependent variables between each fiscal
year, as opposed to the dollar amounts utilized in the first regressions. The full regression table is
presented in Appendix A. The use of percent change tends to reduce variability; while using the
dollar amounts shows the trend across all five years, the percent change is calculated between
each year (i.e. change from FY2011 to FY2012, then from FY2012 to FY2013, etc.) and shows
whether the growth rate of the financial indicators is greater in hospitals located in expansion
states. In these regressions, only the estimate for percent change of net patient revenue was
statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. The result showed that Medicaid expansion is
associated with an average increase of seven percent in net patient revenue, all else equal. The
lack of statistical significance of the estimates for percent change of total revenue and total
income does not lessen their significant results in the previous regressions; it was expected that
utilizing percent change would reduce variability and thus result in lower estimates. Therefore,
this regression simply indicates that the growth rate of net patient revenue was statistically
significantly higher after Medicaid expansion.
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I performed two other robustness checks, to accommodate for a specific characteristic
and a limitation of the data, respectively. First, while the majority of states included in this study
expanded Medicaid effective January 1, 2014, three states expanded on later dates. To ensure
that this variation did not bias the estimates, I estimated regressions without the four hospitals
located in the late-expansion states. The full results are presented in Appendix B. The estimates
for the effect of Medicaid expansion on the four dependent variables are similar to those
presented in the first regressions; there are statistically significant increases in total revenue and
net patient revenue, and a statistically significant decrease in operating margin. Additionally, the
coefficients are marginally higher than those in the original regressions. This could be due to the
fact that, for the hospitals in states that expanded Medicaid more recently, less time has passed
during which an effect might be evident. Therefore, although the volume of the effect is slightly
higher when only including hospitals in states that expanded Medicaid effective January 1, 2014,
the effect is evident and strongly significant in both cases, and is thus robust to this change.
Additionally, I performed a robustness check because of missing data for the 2015 fiscal
year. This issue is discussed in further detail in the following Limitations section; in short,
because only approximately half of the hospitals included in this study had reported their fiscal
year 2015 financial data as of March 2016, it is important to determine whether this missing data
impacts the results. Thus, I estimated regressions using only data from fiscal years 2011 through
2014. The full regression results are presented in Appendix C. The results of these regressions
show that Medicaid expansion is associated with statistically significant increases in total
revenue and net patient revenue at the p < 0.05 level. However, in these results, the coefficients
are marginally smaller than those in the original regressions. This is intuitive, considering that
using data through fiscal year 2014 gives only six months of post-expansion data in the 2014
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fiscal year, a relatively short time period from which to estimate an effect. Additionally, there is
no significant effect on operating margin in this case, although the coefficient remains negative.
The lack of significance could be due to the fact that, at the end of fiscal year 2014, hospitals’
operating expenses had not yet caught up to their utilization of resources. Thus, in general, the
results remain robust to the issue of missing data.
Limitations
There are limitations to note when considering the results of this study. The most evident
limitation is the relative paucity of data post-Medicaid expansion. The expansion was
implemented on January 1, 2014 in most states; thus, there are, at most, data for 1.5 fiscal years
post-expansion. Therefore, it is difficult to extrapolate a long-term trend from this data. For that
reason, this analysis should be considered preliminary, to be supplemented by further research
when more post-expansion data is available.
Additionally, it is important to note that there are missing observations in the data. The
data for all of the independent variables are complete. However, 16 hospitals have yet to report
financial data for the 2015 fiscal year. Missing data may be classified as missing completely at
random, in which the included data is a random sample, and thus representative, of the full data
set; missing at random, in which the missing data is due to a factor related to a completely
observed variable in the data set; or missing due to a factor directly related to the value of the
variable (Pigott, 2001). The first two instances are considered ignorable; the only caveat is that
estimates may be less precise due to the missing data, but they are still representative of the
entire sample (Pigott, 2001). In this case, I consider the missing data to be missing completely at
random, and thus ignorable. However, I estimated regressions identical to those in the study, but
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using only data from fiscal years 2011 through 2014, as a robustness check. The results are
discussed in the Analysis section.
Finally, Medicaid expansion is a time-variant variable. It is possible that there are other
factors, such as economic occurrences or implementation of other regulations, which affect the
estimates of these models. All time-invariant variables are controlled within the fixed effects
model, but factors that have been implemented or changed over time, such as interest rate
fluctuations or new or changed regulations, have the potential to impact the estimates. However,
the models have proven robust to several checks. Therefore, the estimates presented in this study
are effective in approximating the effect of Medicaid expansion on hospital financial measures.
Policy Implications
This analysis discusses the initial impact of Medicaid expansion on hospital financial
measures. Though increasing hospital revenue was an anticipated effect of the Medicaid
expansion, it was not a primary goal. Therefore, this study should not be considered an
assessment of the effectiveness of Medicaid expansion, yet it is still important to understand all
of a policy’s implications and effects. As mentioned previously, the hypothesized increase in
hospital revenue as a result of expansion was intended to help offset other funding decreases
written into the ACA. It is beyond the scope of this study to conjecture as to whether the revenue
increases will fully offset the other decreases; that will be an important topic for future research.
It is also difficult to conjecture whether this pivotal legislation will indeed reduce health
care spending in the United States, particularly because the legislation has initiated a vast
number of changes in the U.S. health care system, the effects of which are yet to be fully
understood. In this paper, I discuss both increases and decreases in federal spending on health
care. For example, federal spending on Medicare fee-for-service payments and disproportionate
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share hospital assistance are sharply curtailed under the ACA, yet the federal government is
paying a much higher share of the costs for new Medicaid enrollees than it does for those
enrolled in Medicaid prior to the ACA. Therefore, future study will be necessary to gain a more
comprehensive understanding of the effects of the ACA and Medicaid expansion on federal
health care spending.
Conclusion
The expansion of Medicaid was predicted to have numerous effects, including increasing
hospital revenue. This study shows statistically significant increases in hospitals’ revenue and net
patient revenue and a statistically significant decrease in operating margin, all else equal,
immediately following Medicaid expansion. This analysis provides preliminary results as to the
effect of Medicaid expansion on hospital financial measures. However, future research will be
instructive in determining whether these effects remain constant, increase, or decrease as more
time passes post-expansion.
Additionally, Medicaid expansion continues to be a highly dynamic issue. Expansion is
actively under discussion in several states, while at least one state is reforming the expansion
already in effect. At the federal level, the outcome of the highly contentious 2016 presidential
election, as well as the possibility of significant change in the composition of U.S. Congress,
could lead to changes in health care legislation. Finally, at the end of the 2016 calendar year,
states that expanded Medicaid will begin to pay a small percentage of the costs associated with
the expansion and new Medicaid enrollees. It is possible that this change will affect hospital
financial measures, as states determine how to fund their expansions. Thus, it is evident that
further study is critical to understanding the short- and long-term effects of Medicaid expansion
in the United States.
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Appendix A:
Regression Estimates Using Percent Change
Percent
change, total
revenue
0.0487
Medicaid expansion
(0.0478)
1.43e-05*
Discharges
(7.56e-06)
0.230*
Mean length of stay
(0.123)
0.00146
% ICU cases
(0.00491)
0.0116
Mean ICU days
(0.00754)
0.000100*
Cases with 1+ complications
(5.06e-05)
-0.383
Case mix index
(0.465)
-2.16e-05
Emergency admissions
(1.62e-05)
-0.0379*
% private payer
(0.0187)
-0.0262**
% Medicaid
(0.0123)
-0.0492**
% Medicare
(0.0213)
2.540**
Constant
(1.230)
94
Observations
31
Number of units
0.921
Rho
0.335
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Percent
change, total
income
1.088
(1.186)
0.000132
(0.000168)
-1.441
(2.071)
-0.0691
(0.0967)
0.104
(0.112)
0.00188*
(0.000934)
-6.004
(8.794)
-0.000244
(0.000339)
-0.114
(0.228)
-0.0293
(0.121)
-0.0280
(0.229)
21.12
(17.37)
94
31
0.654
0.172

Percent change,
operating
margin
1.600
(0.978)
2.79e-05
(7.25e-05)
-1.839
(1.758)
-0.0161
(0.0507)
0.0583
(0.0609)
0.000350
(0.000497)
-3.500
(4.411)
9.34e-05
(0.000177)
-0.0960
(0.290)
0.225
(0.135)
0.133
(0.187)
5.579
(18.63)
94
31
0.824
0.220

Percent change,
net patient
revenue
0.0675**
(0.0300)
1.01e-05
(6.16e-06)
0.123
(0.0793)
0.00277
(0.00433)
0.0117**
(0.00544)
6.86e-05*
(3.55e-05)
-0.579*
(0.308)
-1.17e-05
(1.32e-05)
-0.0126
(0.0144)
-0.00886
(0.00915)
-0.0306*
(0.0153)
1.643*
(0.861)
94
31
0.917
0.387
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Appendix B:
Regression Estimates Excluding Hospitals in States that Expanded Medicaid After
January 1, 2014

Medicaid expansion
Discharges
Mean length of stay
% ICU cases
Mean ICU days
Cases with 1+ complications
Case mix index
Emergency admissions
% private payer
% Medicaid
% Medicare
Constant
Observations
Number of units
Rho
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Total
revenue
259.3*
(148.2)
0.0211
(0.0183)
-63.20
(223.5)
-10.14
(7.246)
-0.561
(6.908)
0.332**
(0.133)
1,712*
(930.2)
-0.0390
(0.0311)
-43.17
(38.29)
-20.58
(26.59)
-71.82
(49.13)
2,843
(2,371)
110
27
0.870
0.406

Total income
86.44
(63.18)
0.0104
(0.00784)
28.37
(89.34)
-2.402
(4.187)
0.564
(3.175)
0.135**
(0.0629)
-23.27
(431.8)
-0.0221
(0.0140)
-25.34
(18.86)
-13.49
(11.79)
-32.10
(21.82)
1,987*
(1,054)
110
27
0.788
0.228

Operating
margin
-1.169*
(0.631)
0.000104
(0.000115)
-0.392
(2.094)
0.0234
(0.0513)
0.232**
(0.112)
0.00244***
(0.000554)
-13.25**
(5.517)
-6.38e-05
(0.000175)
0.401**
(0.180)
0.259***
(0.0877)
0.422**
(0.169)
-11.78
(9.641)
110
27
0.952
0.294

Net patient
revenue
162.3*
(91.43)
0.0128
(0.0110)
-170.8
(165.8)
-11.93**
(4.562)
2.921
(4.637)
0.242**
(0.0895)
1,415**
(619.0)
-0.0190
(0.0185)
-9.075
(21.68)
-1.532
(16.67)
-21.46
(28.12)
659.2
(1,541)
110
27
0.923
0.496
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Appendix C:
Regression Estimates Using Only Fiscal Years 2011 through 2014

Total revenue
196.3**
Medicaid expansion
(94.36)
0.00223
Discharges
(0.0122)
43.62
Mean length of stay
(209.3)
-2.197
% ICU cases
(4.491)
-9.692
Mean ICU days
(5.853)
0.162**
Cases with 1+ complications
(0.0712)
1,477**
Case mix index
(550.5)
-0.00609
Emergency admissions
(0.0227)
-20.51
% private payer
(26.29)
-3.251
% Medicaid
(19.07)
-43.12
% Medicare
(29.36)
1,013
Constant
(1,995)
109
Observations
31
Number of units
0.960
Rho
0.447
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Total income
43.45
(34.08)
0.00416
(0.00476)
10.38
(84.97)
-0.740
(2.339)
0.493
(2.797)
0.0825***
(0.0290)
-175.0
(314.3)
-0.0102
(0.00894)
-3.218
(8.359)
0.0518
(6.910)
-9.739
(7.389)
694.5
(670.2)
109
31
0.837
0.226

Operating
margin
-0.699
(0.796)
4.74e-05
(0.000130)
0.668
(2.494)
0.0222
(0.0550)
0.116
(0.0962)
0.00199**
(0.000734)
-14.65**
(7.127)
2.32e-05
(0.000204)
0.270
(0.344)
0.0837
(0.199)
0.211
(0.230)
1.587
(16.02)
109
31
0.942
0.192

Net patient
revenue
143.3**
(66.72)
-0.00132
(0.00885)
-41.49
(164.8)
-5.016
(3.871)
-7.128
(5.635)
0.129**
(0.0585)
1,186**
(558.5)
0.00332
(0.0167)
-1.683
(19.19)
2.418
(15.11)
-13.96
(18.51)
121.6
(1,547)
109
31
0.972
0.445

